Whether certain transmission costs should be directly assigned to a new large-use customer class?

While this matter (and the November 2023 RTEP Order) both arise in PJM, the issue of the proper regional cost allocation for public policy-driven transmission projects is not confined to PJM, but is applicable across all of the nation’s multi-state RTOs.  Since RTOs are regulated by this Commission, I believe that the time has come for this Commission to take the lead in its convening role to initiate a proceeding, such as a Notice of Inquiry, a series of technical conferences, or by initiating an FPA section 206 proceeding outside this docket, posing such important questions, among others, as:  What is the proper definition of a public policy transmission project?  Does the definition of public policy transmission project need to be changed for purposes of regional cost allocation?  How should public policy transmission projects be cost-allocated in a multi-state RTO?  In my view the states themselves need to be at the forefront of deciding these questions, as it is their own state policies that are largely making these questions unavoidable, as these two recent PJM RTEP cases graphically illustrate.

From 2009 through 2011, PATH spent more than $6 million on various activities to support its applications for Certificates. Through hired public relations contractors, PATH organized "reliable power coalitions" that would recruit individuals—often prominent business and labor leaders—to testify before the state utility commissions in support of PATH's certificate applications. PATH's contractors also polled public opinion of the project, ran promotional advertisements, and sent lobbyists to persuade state officials that the Certificates should be granted.
There is little question that PATH made these disputed expenditures to influence the decisions of public officials. The record is full of statements to that effect. The internal communications of PATH's public relations contractors, for example, declared that "[w]e have but one singular goal—to help get PATH approved," a goal that would be achieved by "generating the political cover that commissioners/legislators need to ‘do the right thing.’ " J.A. 66; see also J.A. 142-44 (contractor agreement with public relations firm). And the advertisements PATH's agents ran were persuasive rather than merely informational, focusing on arguments in support of approval and construction of PATH's proposed transmission line. See, e.g. , J.A. 115, 117-18, 121.
Newman v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 27 F.4th 690, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

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MARL’s in-service date is already slipping. Why is that relevant? Because the electric grid abhors a vacuum. When a planned transmission (or generation) project fails to come online when needed, other projects will take its place. That’s exactly what happened with the PATH project, and what is likely to happen with the MARL project, including the Potomac Edison portion that is the subject of this filing. 

This transmission project may never happen, but PJM and the utilities involved feel they should pursue it anyhow. Is that because there are no other options? Or is it because there’s no harm done to them if it fails. All the burden of failure falls on ratepayers, and this encourages the utilities to take more of a chance than they would it they had some skin in the game. Utilities shoulder no risk, while collecting all the rewards. 
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Consumers have zero control over the project’s risk factors, but they are the ones left holding the bag when it fails. As consumers, we simply cannot afford to continue to financially cover the failures of grid planners and transmission developers simply because we are the one entity without a voice in incentive awards. 

DOE is buying something that it doesn't need and won't ever use, but will put a lot of money in the pockets of private investors who otherwise would have no buyers for their overpriced service.  Can I just say "I told you so" in advance?  This program is wasteful, illogical, and unfair.

PJM utilizes a hybrid cost allocation method, which the Commission found complies with Order No. 1000, for Regional Facilities and Necessary Lower Voltage Facilities that address a reliability need.  Under this method, PJM allocates 50% of the costs of Regional Facilities or Necessary Lower Voltage Facilities on a load-ratio share basis and the other 50% based on the solution-based distribution factor (DFAX) method.  PJM allocates all of the costs of Lower Voltage Facilities using the solution-based DFAX method.  Cost responsibility assignments pursuant to the Order No. 1000-compliant cost allocation method are included in Schedule 12-Appendix A of the Tariff. 

PJM has told us that if we fail to approve those transmission projects in this RTEP driven by the closure of the Brandon Shores coal generating unit located in Maryland, the grid will likely suffer a severe voltage collapse in Baltimore and the surrounding zones, including Northern Virginia, the District of Columbia, Delaware and southeastern Pennsylvania. Such a result could be potentially catastrophic.
While these projects are very costly – and I take seriously the concerns expressed by the Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI), Maryland Public Service Commission (MD PSC) and Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (OPC) – given this Hobson’s choice I concur with approving PJM’s RTEP filing.
While I concur, I note that this element of the RTEP filing raises more questions than it answers, and some of those questions are extraordinarily important.  

Let me emphasize that the State of Maryland, within its sovereign police powers, clearly has the authority to mandate any particular mix of generating resources it prefers.  Maryland’s new climate law is well within its inherent authority to enact.  Such policies are for Marylanders to choose, not RTOs or FERC.  But if the resulting transmission projects under protest in this RTEP filing are caused more by Maryland’s policy choices than by organic load growth and economic resource retirements, then a salient question that may be asked is whether these transmission projects are more accurately categorized as public policy projects, essentially the same as the transmission upgrades caused by New Jersey’s offshore wind projects?
And if they are more accurately categorized as public policy projects, should such projects be regionally cost-allocated, potentially to consumers in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, et al.?

It is ultimately the job of each state to ensure resource adequacy to serve its consumers, even in a multi-state RTO. ​

Protect Our Winters, a group formed to safeguard outdoor recreation from the effects of climate change, is advocating a draft bill that would increase fees on Energy Department loans for transmission lines, with the new revenues going for infrastructure projects in communities where the new lines are built.

In doing so, the group is hoping to dispel a “not in my backyard” mentality that has been common in some rural communities, where transmission lines were seen as detriments to the aesthetics of the wilderness frequented by skiers, climbers and outdoor enthusiasts.

The group’s staff, along with outdoor athletes, are seeking support for the draft they partnered on with Rep. Ann McLane Kuster, D-N.H., hoping that it will garner bicameral, bipartisan support when it’s formally introduced. The group came to Washington last week to drum up support.

I saw and heard many statements today that a grant project must “be connected to”, “nearby”, or “have a nexus to” a transmission project.  In order to determine if applying for funding is even worthwhile, I need to have this explained.

1. DOE has not specifically defined a geographic distance from the project for eligibility purposes.  We anticipate that each project may differ in its scope and impact, therefore we have requested that each applicant should explain how their proposed project is eligible for support under this program. In addition, please note that the merit review criteria listed in the FOA at Section V states that applications for economic development activities will be assessed in part based on, “The extent and clarity of the connection described in the Application between the proposed activities and economic development benefits in communities that are likely to be impacted by a covered transmission project.”
   
   

How will “communities that may be affected by the construction and operation of a covered transmission project” be defined for eligibility purposes?  How far from the centerline of the transmission project does such a community extend?

1. As we anticipate that impacts may vary by project and by community, DOE has requested Applicants for Area of Interest 2 address how the project will promote economic development in areas that may be affected by the construction and operation of a covered transmission project. See Section IV.E.iii of the FOA.
   
   

What is considered an “affect” of construction and operation of the project?

1. For an understanding of how grants will be awarded, please refer to the merit review criteria for Area of Interest 1 (siting and permitting) and Area of Interest 2 (economic development) listed in the FOA at Section V. You may also refer to the “Standards for Application Evaluation” and “Other Selection Factors” including “Program Policy Factors” that are also referenced in Section V of the FOA. 
   
   

How will an economic development grant be expected to speed up siting and permitting?

1. While the funds associated with an economic development grant can only be disbursed once either the siting authority has approved the covered transmission project (if the applicant is a siting authority) or construction has commenced (if the applicant is a state, local, or Tribal governmental entity other than a siting authority), DOE may select awardees for economic development grants prior to a decision to site and permit the relevant transmission project and obligate federal funds for such awardees.  To the extent that the activities, if awarded, would accelerate transmission siting timelines and/or increase the chance that a transmission project would be developed, DOE will consider that as part of the established Merit Review Criteria.

Kuster, a member of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, noted in a statement that the U.S. may need to triple energy transmission capacity by 2050 to meet the target of net-zero carbon emissions by bringing more renewable electricity generation on line.

“In order to make that a reality, we must ensure that communities where transmission projects will be built are excited to host these lines,” Kuster said.  “By securing tangible benefits for the towns and cities that host these projects, like new schools, roads, or outdoor recreation facilities, in addition to improved electricity reliability, this legislation will help build support for transmission projects across the country.”

“There’s been this move afoot in which markets have become something closer to a mechanism by which to harvest … subsidies, rather than what they were intended to do, which is ensure least cost dispatch of available resources and to incentivize new investment.”

For the most part, RTOs have embraced the goal of economic efficiency for the past 23 years (since Order No. 2000). However, some RTOs have begun to include the “clean‐​energy transition” and “environmentally sustainable power system” in their mission statements. Advocates of economic efficiency should be concerned that the IRA will push RTOs further into a new era in which the goal of economic efficiency is secondary to environmental goals or ignored entirely.

The value of the PTC today is $27.50 per megawatt‐​hour. In the price contour map above, several of the indicated hubs were trading below that amount (in the range of $25–26 per megawatt‐​hour). Again, in most other industries, a federal subsidy larger than the price of the commodity would be unimaginable—people familiar with the industry would sound alarms about the distorting effects of large subsidies. People would be justified in losing their temper, for example, if Congress implemented a new federal subsidy of $70–90 per barrel of crude oil produced in the United States (the going rate over the last year or so). With subsidies larger than the commodity price, will RTOs trade as much (or more) in federal subsidies as they do in electricity?

Coal and natural gas are dispatchable generation resources that presently provide 60 percent of our electricity. They are also essential if grid operators are to maintain reliability. Subsidies for intermittent generation will lead to the retirement or bankruptcy of dispatchable resources, which will not only create challenges in maintaining grid reliability but will open the door for subsidies for dispatchable resources (whether or not they are truly needed for reliability). Such a subsidy spiral could be endless and could pit federal subsidies in the IRA against state subsidies for preferred resources, all paid for by American taxpayers or electricity customers one way or another.

Counting the many reasons to repeal the energy subsidies in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has become my favorite activity.