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How Much Does Opposition Cost?

12/6/2018

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Opposition to new aerial transmission lines is nothing new.  It's been around almost as long as the transmission lines themselves.  Nobody wants to live with these things, but in the past they may have been a necessary evil, and in the past it may have been easier to overwhelm small communities to force an involuntary sacrifice.  The people were sacrificing their home, business, health, sense of place and peace of mind for benefit of other people who needed electricity.  We electrified the country in the last century.  Mission accomplished.

But today's transmission lines aren't needed for the same reasons.  The vast majority of today's transmission proposals are for other reasons, such as cheaper prices for customers in other regions, or "cleaner" energy for other regions.  It's no longer about bringing electricity to people without it, and it's not all about keeping the grid we have functioning and reliable.  For today's transmission companies, it's also about profit.  There's a fortune to be made constructing transmission and controlling new pathways to transport electricity further and further from its point of generation.

Today's transmission opposition has also undergone a vast sea change from the small, disconnected community groups of yore.  Now it's easy for small groups to connect with others and tap the experience of successful opposition groups, thanks to the internet.  We communicate differently in this century, and communication is oftentimes the secret sauce of success.  While transmission companies haven't changed their "best practice" tactics in decades, opposition is fleet and malleable.  The secret hierarchy of opposition groups makes them quick to adapt, and even quicker to deploy new, winning tactics.  The opponents are fighting with their hearts, the industry is fighting from a stale, dog-eared "playbook."  It's just a job for the industry warriors.  Personally, the only thing they get out of victory is a pat on the head, or maybe a bonus or promotion.  Opponents receive the opportunity to maintain the status quo, at least until the next transmission proposal invades.  They don't get a bonus.  In fact, the only return on their investment may be gazing out the window and not seeing an ugly transmission tower.  The transmission employee merely moves on to the next job... he can't see those towers from his house!  It's all about motivation, and transmission opposition groups are racking up an amazing list of victories.  It's simply no longer true that the transmission company wins every time.  In fact, they're probably closer to losing most of the time when faced with organized opposition.  Opposition is costing transmission companies a lot of money and often outright cancellation or failure of transmission proposals.

This recent opinion piece from Transmission Developers Inc. (TDI) defends its project from the inaccurate characterization of its project from competing transmission company Central Maine Power (CMP).  The two projects, both purposed to transmit hydropower from Quebec to Massachusetts, couldn't be more different.   CMP proposes aerial lines and many miles of new right of way through the Maine wilderness.  TDI, on the other hand, proposes new transmission that is underground and underwater, with no new overhead transmission lines.  CMP is also a second attempt to build new aerial lines to satisfy Massachusetts' huge appetite for "clean" power generated elsewhere (Not In My Backyard, eh, Massachusetts?).  Massachusetts' first choice was the ill-fated Northern Pass project through New Hampshire.  When that project was rejected by New Hampshire, CMP was selected as the second choice.  TDI gets no love from Massachusetts, who is only looking at the proposed cost, not the actual cost.  TDI points out something very important in its letter:
TDI, from the very beginning, took important community, environmental and aesthetic considerations into account when designing and siting the NECPL. TDI carefully chose underground technology specifically to minimize impacts on the people, viewshed and environment of Vermont. We recognized that the additional expense related to underground construction for NECPL was worth the alleviation of a multitude of genuine community and environmental concerns, and that the cost of any project can’t only be measured in dollars.
But can it be measured in dollars?  I think we can get pretty close!  Opposition causes real expense.

1.  Purchased advocacy.  Transmission companies first knee-jerk reaction to organized opposition is to compete with it by purchasing advocacy.  Front groups, advertising, and "donations" to advocate groups to win their favor cost money.  How much?  It sort of depends on how big a campaign the transmission company thinks it needs.  It also depends on the size of the opposition.  A bigger opposition requires larger expenditures to secure advocates.  People who are willing to sell their community down river for benefit of an out-of-state intruder can be pretty pricey if they're likely to receive a lifetime of ostracized backlash from their neighbors.  A transmission company can easily spend $10M or more on purchased advocacy.  Cha-ching!

2.  "Mitigation" payments to communities and community groups.  This can be a huge expense!  Transmission companies make agreements to "mitigate" their effect on local communities with monies paid to local governments, organizations, and business groups who are happy to push their community under the bus in exchange for cash.  Local governments figure payments from transmission companies benefit the community as a whole, and some of them are amazingly cheap dates.  Others not so much.  Organizations and business groups are all about personal profit or concessions that benefit the group or organization, at the expense of the community.  This is pure greed!  A transmission company can shell out at least $100M in "mitigation" payments to governments and groups that drive a hard bargain.  Cha-ching!

3.  Increased regulatory costs.  Opposition in the regulatory process costs money.  A transmission company must spend more money on legal fees, experts, and bogus "studies" to be submitted as evidence in the regulatory process.  A transmission company may also shell out a whole bunch of money to purchase the best political influence on the regulatory decision.  We're talking hundreds of millions of dollars in this category alone.  Cha-ching!

4.  Permitting delays.  Time is money, and good opposition can cause increased permitting delays.  An uncontested application can sail through the regulatory process in record time.  A contested application drags on and on and on.  How much does delay cost?  Over a month?  Over a number of months?  Over a year?  Over a number of years?  Opposition permitting delays are usually of the "years" category of delay.  The cost of delay to the transmission company can vary.  With a merchant project, the entire cost of the delay and value of the sunk investment is on the company.  This is hugely expensive.  With a ratepayer guaranteed, cost-allocated project it still costs just as much, however ratepayers are picking up the additional costs of delay, and paying the transmission company for the cost of its investment during the process.  While the costs are the same, it's all about who pays.  In the case of the merchant New England projects, the cost is on the company.  Cha-ching!

5.  Permitting failure.  It's reasonable to plan that a merchant transmission project may fail entirely after shelling out the money noted in the four previous categories.  In this case, the transmission company is left with nothing but a huge debt and some pretty angry investors.  Example:  The Clean Line merchant projects that spent over $200M in "development" costs and then failed to receive enough permits to build (and couldn't find any customers to pay for the projects, which was another huge factor in the failure).  Cha-ching!

A transmission project buried on existing public or private rights of way (such as roads or railroads, or under large bodies of water) that doesn't cross privately owned land, and doesn't use eminent domain, doesn't create the same kind of expensive opposition.  A project without opposition can avoid the expense of opposition, and as we've discussed, opposition costs money.  Lots of money.

A buried project may cost more to build, but it provides the kind of regulatory and price certainty that transmission companies need.  The odds are good that a buried project will be approved and built, whereas an aerial project with entrenched opposition will probably not be approved and will never be built.  Any customer who looks solely at price when considering competing transmission proposals fails to realize that after the cost and risk of opposition is added, they're going to end up paying the same, or more.  They may also experience the cost of failure.

Opposition is too expensive.  Choose the buried option.
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"Some" Landowners Interfering With Investors' "Overhead Cash Registers"

11/10/2018

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The arrogant renewable energy folks had a "forum" this week.  On the day of the "forum" a renewable energy news outlet ran a series of three obnoxious articles telling people that the electric transmission grid is outdated and overly congested.  The solution?  Lots more new transmission "for renewables."  (read wind).

This is never going to happen.  The reasons why are clear, if slightly beyond the thought capacity of an industry that continues to lie to itself.  Merchant transmission  has been a gigantic failure.  The articles gush on about troubled projects that have racked up one failure after another, while also noting the complete failure ("the wheels came off") of many others.  News flash:  They're all going to fail eventually!  Not one "renewable" merchant transmission project has been built.  They can't be built.

Reasons why include:

1.  No customers to pay for them!  Even when Clean Line thought it had the green light for its Plains & Eastern project, it failed to attract any customers to pay for it, and Clean Line bailed at the first opportunity to unload this cash cow onto a utility wannabe who thought it could use part of the project as leverage to profit off a real utility's plan to construct a wind farm and the world's longest generation tie line.

2.  RTO's are not designed to facilitate exports.  RTO's are purposed to serve their region and therefore costs of serving the region are visited upon the consumers in that region.  Exporting electricity to other regions does not serve anyone in the region.  Asking different regions to build new transmission to patch regions together to serve the renewable energy industry doesn't benefit anyone in any of the regions either.  One article even claims that new "renewable" transmission lines "represent potential overhead cash registers for their owners."  So, this is all about an industry cashing in for their own benefit?  But yet...

3.  "Some" landowners oppose transmission.  Why the modifier "some?"  What is that supposed to represent anyhow?  That only a handful of landowners object to superrich investors and foreign corporations erecting an "overhead cash register" on their land using the power of eminent domain to take private property?  Sorry, but you're wrong about "some," if that's supposed to mean a small number.  Eminent domain for private gain is widely opposed by both affected and unaffected landowners.  Only "some" landowners are in favor of it, those who don't live on the land and are looking for a quick payday, or perhaps those who obliviously believe they're going to be richly compensated for the use of their land (or quid pro quo payments for being a public advocate for the transmission project).

Or perhaps "some" is an attempt at denying the power of landowners to derail transmission proposals?  Even though landowners were the biggest impediment to Clean Line's projects, Clean Line still wants to claim its projects failed due to the efforts of "a major utility, and prominent state politicians" and "some landowners."  As if the landowners were not the impetus for the political opposition, and as if a major utility opposed more than one of Clean Line's projects?  It was the landowners, Sherlock!  They are powerful, and they are the primary reason transmission projects are cancelled.  Wasn't it Sun Tzu who said "know your enemy"?  Denying the power of your most stalwart enemy is a fool's paradise.

Here's the basic truth:  Eminent domain for the purpose of erecting an "overhead cash register" on private property is frowned upon.  Sure, there was that awful Supreme Court decision that eminent domain could be used for "economic development" purposes, but that came with overwhelming backlash.  Eminent domain's historical use by utilities to serve all customers cannot be extended to erect "overhead cash registers" on private property.  New "renewable" transmission isn't necessary to provide electricity.  The grid we have is managing to keep the light on (for the most part).  One person's desire to obtain a different kind of electricity does not override another person's right to own and enjoy property.  If a company desires to erect an "overhead cash register" on private property, it's going to need landowner buy in.

How to get there?  It's not any of the ways renewable energy companies and environmentalists have proposed.  Landowner aggregation schemes, increased easement payments, even royalties, are not adequate for "some" landowners.  "Some" landowners simply do not want to sell an easement for any reason.  The "eking out and incremental solutions" (in the words of Jayshree Desai, former CLEPT-O, now spending some other investors money as ConnectGen) doesn't reside in erecting "overhead cash registers" on private property.  It resides in new ideas for buried transmission on existing rights of way, along railroads or highways.  That's the solution.  That's the way to "...figure out longer-haul, bulk transmission to really change the fundamental supply-demand balance of renewables in this country," Ms. Jayshree.  Jayshree and her band of Don Quixotes wasted more than $200M of investor cash trying to build "overhead cash registers" on private property.  And still one of the Dons persists because he can't pull his head out of the clouds (or another place closer to the ground). 

Overhead merchant transmission is dead!  The renewable energy industry and its environmental sycophants should should stop wasting their money and efforts on "overhead cash registers" and invest it in underground solutions.  The cost of these solution must be borne by the beneficiaries, in this case it's the renewable energy industry, or its customers.  The rest of us aren't going to pay for it.  You want to make money?  You gotta spend money!  The answer is at hand.  Don't make me grab you by the scruff of your neck and rub your nose in it.

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Market Monitor Says  PJM needs to reevaluate its rules governing cost benefit analysis and cost allocation for economic projects

11/9/2018

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Ut-oh, PJM!  Trouble in paradise!  The independent monitor (MMU) of your activities thinks your "market efficiency" process isn't so efficient.  And it's probably costing electric consumers in the PJM region money in their electric bills.

In its recently released Quarterly State of the Market Report, the MMU recommended:
The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate the rules governing cost benefit analysis and cost allocation for economic projects. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)
This is a new recommendation of medium priority.  Time to get hopping, PJM, as if you ever take constructive criticism well.

Let's combine this with one of MMU's long standing recommendations:
The MMU recommends the creation of a mechanism to permit a direct comparison, or competition, between transmission and generation alternatives, including which alternative is less costly and who bears the risks associated with each alternative. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)
This all adds up to fail.  PJM is failing to properly plan market efficiency transmission projects.  In PJM's world, the road to new market efficiency transmission projects is long.  However, the congestion to be alleviated by new transmission is fleeting and short-lived.  PJM knee-jerked when implementing FERC's competitive transmission Order 1000 to open a project window to alleviate congestion on its AP South Interface in 2014.  That's four years ago and counting.  By the time PJM got around to selecting and ordering a project to alleviate the congestion, the congestion had alleviated itself.  But PJM kept on with the project, believing that it is captive to its own bloated processes.  The project PJM ordered is the Transource Independence Energy Connection, and it's no longer needed.

But because Transource was granted an "incentive" to build its project by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that allows the company to recover all its sunk costs on the project (plus 10.4% return on its equity), no harm will come to Transource or PJM if they continue this unneeded project.  All the cost and risk is borne by electric consumers.

How unneeded is this project?  A look at the MMU's Congestion and Marginal Losses report section informs that congestion is now elsewhere.  The AP South Interface is a minor issue.
Differences in CLMP among eastern, southern and western control zones in PJM were primarily a result of congestion on the AEP - DOM Interface, the Cloverdale Transformer, the Tanners Creek - Miami Fort Flowgate, the Graceton - Safe Harbor Line, and the 5004/5005 Interface.
The AEP - DOM Interface was the largest contributor to congestion costs in the first nine months of 2018. With $120.4 million in total congestion costs, it accounted for 10.8 percent of the total PJM congestion costs in the first nine months of 2018.

Get that, PJM?  Congestion has shifted.  AP South no longer has a serious congestion issue.  In fact, it's minor.  In fact, it only contributes 1.8% of total congestion in PJM.
Picture
PJM could spend our money better chasing the 9 constraints that cause more congestion than AP South.  Of course, if they do, by the time they select and order transmission projects to alleviate this congestion, the congestion will have moved on elsewhere.  PJM is chasing its own tail planning market efficiency projects.  And this is why it needs to reform its rules on market efficiency transmission planning.

Once a project is approved and ordered, PJM will never admit failure.  Instead, PJM will continue to prop up unneeded market efficiency projects and throw good money (OUR money) after bad through questionable cost benefit analyses that keep the project (barely) alive.

There's no amount of magic math that will make the Transource IEC economically beneficial.  It's time to let this project go.  PJM has had plenty of opportunity to fall gracefully on its sword and stop the ratepayer bleeding.  Its recent re-evaluation of IEC was rigged, and even then IEC barely jumped the threshold.  Another opportunity arose when Transource recently adjusted its in-service date ahead 5 months.  PJM's Designated Entity Agreement with Transource required the project to be in-service by June 2020.  PJM could have cancelled the project instead of allowing the in-service shift.  The failure to meet milestone dates in the DEA is a breach of contract, and in that event PJM (the Transmission Operator) can default on the DEA.  Over and done.

Instead, PJM keeps wasting our money on its bad idea.  PJM is failing consumers.  Not only that, now it's been called out on its failure by its Market Monitor.  It's time to cancel the Independence Energy Connection.
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PJM and Transource Scheme to Skew Benefit/Cost Analysis

10/29/2018

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by Barron Shaw, Citizens to Stop Transource
In recent days it has become apparent that PJM and Transource are attempting to re-frame the proposed IEC high voltage line project that would cross preserved farms in Pennsylvania and Maryland.  The project was originally proposed and filed in both Pennsylvania and Maryland as a market efficiency project, for the sole purpose of reducing the price of electricity in the Washington DC metro market.[1]  As the case has progressed, both Maryland and Pennsylvania have expressed misgivings about the project, capped by the revelation two weeks ago that the IEC would result in a net loss of $480M across all PJM zones.[2]
 
Faced with near certain failure, PJM is trying to reposition the IEC as a reliability project.  Their contention is that unless the project is built, there would be serious reliability issues.
 
This is a desperate assertion made by an organization that has no credibility remaining.  PJM put this project forward as an “efficiency project” knowing that it would cause a significant increase in rates in Pennsylvania and surrounding states.  PJM turned a blind eye to using two newly constructed high voltage lines owned by other utilities that parallel the IEC-East that stand half empty, and when asked, said it wasn't their job to ensure their usage.  PJM allowed Transource to announce their new cost estimates one month after PJM announced their recalculated benefits for the project, in effect giving Transource the ability to provide the “right” answer and save the project from cancellation.  PJM selected Transource's proposed project, even though it was by far the most expensive bid, and included no cost cap.
 
Why would anyone believe PJM's assertion that this project was suddenly all about reliability?  The load forecast for the target market is flat, and every year the forecast is decreased.[3]  New high voltage lines in York and Harford County have been constructed and are operating at less than 50% capacity.  Recent and pending upgrades to move power across the grid in Maryland have drastically cut electrical congestion.  The project is simply not needed.
 
Regulators in both Pennsylvania and Maryland have spent millions analyzing this project for purposes of market efficiency, analysis that is completely useless in the context of reliability.  Transource has already spent upwards of $50M that will all be reimbursable to them, even if the project is canceled.  PJM has wasted too much taxpayer money already.
 
This project is dead, and it is time that PJM admits it and moves on... before people begin to question why PJM is needed at all?


[1] http://www.puc.state.pa.us/pcdocs/1548138.pdf page 7,8

[2] http://stoptransourcemd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/OCA-Direct-Testimony-of-Scott-Rubin-Statement-1.pdf page 38. 

[3] https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/state-specific-reports/2016/2016-maryland-and-dc-state-reports.ashx?la=en page 25-27
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Pennsylvania Testimony Bombs Transource Project

9/26/2018

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Yesterday was the due date for testimony opposing the Transource project at the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.  And it was like a bomb... completely destroying all the pretense of economic benefit from the project.  The truth about the project and PJM's "magic math" will change the way people think about this project forever.  There is no economic benefit for Pennsylvanians.  In fact, Pennsylvanians will end up paying much higher energy costs if this project is approved by the PUC and constructed.

First let's look at the testimony of the three experts on behalf of the Pennsylvania Office of the Consumer Advocate.  Because the testimony is so extensive, I'm going to break it up into separate blog posts for each expert's testimony.  Today, let's tackle OCA expert Scott Rubin's testimony.

Scott Rubin, an independent utility consultant and attorney testified on the regulatory policy issues raised by the Transource project.  Rubin critiques PJM's benefit-cost analysis and offers his opinion on the economic need for the project.  He recommends that the PUC deny Transource's application with prejudice.  This means that a substantially similar case for this project cannot be re-filed after denial.

Here's a quick summary of the bombshells you can find in Rubin's testimony:
• Transource’s filings in this case do not consider the effects of recent changes in Pennsylvania law that should affect the Commission’s review and analysis of the proposed projects.
• Transource’s East and West Applications each identify only one reasonable alternative route to its selected routes. The route selection process apparently failed to consider other routes that would be likely to result in lower cost and lessened environmental impacts.
• PJM’s so-called “benefit-cost” analysis for non-reliability projects like the IEC Project does not properly evaluate the benefits of a proposed project. The analysis completely ignores increases in costs that would be incurred by zones outside of the region benefiting from a project. That is, the economic analysis used by PJM and Transource completely ignores the fact that the lower-cost power that would flow into certain regions is already being used elsewhere.
• While the IEC Project would reduce costs in portions of PJM, the overall effect on PJM would be that the costs of the IEC Project would greatly exceed the project’s benefits. Indeed, accepting all of Transource’s assumptions shows that every dollar invested in the IEC Project would produce less than three cents of benefits for PJM.
• The effects on Pennsylvania consumers would be even more severe than the impact on PJM. Over a 15-year period, consumers in Central and Eastern Pennsylvania would incur increased power costs of more than $340 million while consumers in Western Pennsylvania would receive lower-cost electricity valued at only $2 million.
PJM has pretty much ignored Pennsylvania law and Transource follows suit.  A recent court case, Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth
, and Pennsylvania's recently enacted Act 45 will come into play in the PUC's decision.  Transource is trying to pretend these issues don't exist.  Read more about how these could halt the project in Rubin's testimony.

On routing, Transource failed to provide alternate routes as defined in the Commission's regulations.  Transource's "alternate" routes followed its preferred routes for a large percentage of their way.  A preferred and alternate route should not overlap more than 1/4 of their distance, otherwise there is no alternative.
Rubin does a fantastic job unpacking and explaining PJM's magic math.  While PJM and Transource have been telling the public that the project will save some $800M in energy costs over its first 15 years of use, Rubin reveals that those "benefits" are  not offset against any increased power costs elsewhere in the region.  The $800M in savings is for the special people in the Washington, D.C. metro area.  Costs in Pennsylvania will go up.  Instead of balancing the savings for Washington against the costs for Pennsylvania to come up with an overall "savings," PJM tosses out any numbers from zones that show an increase in costs before adding up its "savings."  Only zones that show a savings are used to measure savings.  Zones that show increased costs are not included in the "savings" equation.
If a zone has a positive ΔNLP – that is, its power costs increase over the 15-year study period – the zone is dropped from the calculation. Only zones whose discounted sum of ΔNLP is negative – that is, power costs decreased over the 15-year period – are included in the benefits calculation.

For this example, I will assume a very simplified system with only three zones. The 15-year NPV of ΔNLP shows the following: Zone 1 has a benefit (lower ΔNLP) of $100; Zone 2 has a benefit of $50; and Zone 3 has a detriment (higher ΔNLP) of -$110. Overall the three zones experience net savings of $40 ($100 + $50 - $110). For purposes of PJM’s analysis, however, Zone 3 would be dropped from the calculation and the project would have a “benefit” of $150.
$800M in "benefits," PJM?  I don't think so.  PJM put its finger on the scale!

And then there's the way PJM calculates "costs."  They use a form of revenue requirement, but not one that in any way resembles the  ratemaking revenue requirement that determines how much consumers actually pay.  Consumers pay a lot of additional costs over and above the capital costs of a project.  PJM's cost calculation is a complete lie... even when the costs are actually updated, which Transource has failed to do.

Rubin confirms that the only purpose for the Transource project is to lower costs for the special people in the Washington metro area.
To over-simplify a bit, the IEC Project will lessen the alleged electrical barriers (congestion) and enable lower-cost electricity to reach the higher cost areas of MD-DC-VA. To be clear, MD-DC-VA have plenty of power, so the IEC Project has no reliability benefit; but costs to those areas can be reduced if additional power can be imported cost effectively from lower-cost areas.
Mr. Rubin takes a deep dive into PJM's benefit-cost analysis and pretty much concludes that PJM's methods don't follow recommended benefit-cost methods.  And here's where the premise for the Transource project falls apart.  I mean just falls completely apart.
Q. Does the so-called benefit-cost methodology required by PJM and used by Transource meet the requirements of a benefit-cost analysis?
A. No. The PJM methodology used by Transource fails to capture all of the benefits and costs associated with the IEC Project.
Busted, PJM!  You are so busted!
...the PJM methodology ignores the negative consequences to utilities (and their customers) outside the region to be benefited. That is, when calculating the benefits of the IEC Project, Transource calculated the reduced power costs (primarily in MD-DC-VA) from being able to import lower-cost power into that region; but it failed to subtract from those benefits the higher costs that would result in other regions (including Pennsylvania) because they would no longer have the benefit of that same lower-cost power.
Do you get where Rubin is going here?  The Transource IEC is going to INCREASE POWER PRICES IN PENNSYLVANIA and other non-benefiting zones in PJM.  And here's where PJM's magic math gets sneaky:
The spreadsheet model includes a calculation of the net benefit or cost for each control area within PJM. Incredibly, though, when it comes time to determine a project’s “benefits” only those regions that would experience reduced  costs are included in the calculation. All regions whose costs would increase as a result of a project are simply ignored.
Let's say that again.
When PJM first reviewed the IEC Project, it found Project benefits of $1,188 million, as shown on the attachment to OCA II-14 (attached as Schedule SJR-1). This represents the present value of 15 years of savings in Net Load Payments (“NLP”) (that is, energy costs). The Schedule shows, however, that this figure completely ignores the zones where energy costs would increase as a result of the IEC Project.
Let's take a look at this table.
Picture
In the table provided by Transource, a positive number represents an increase in power costs (that is a net cost or detriment from the IEC Project) and a negative number represents lower power costs from the IEC Project (a net benefit). Take the first row as an example. AECO is the Atlantic Electric zone within PJM (the greater Atlantic City, NJ, area). This shows that over the first 15 years with the IEC Project in service, power costs would increase by [$17.90] million for Atlantic City area customers if the IEC Project is completed. Simply, this means that AECO currently is able to use slightly more of the lower-cost power than is economically optimal because of constraints that keep some of that power from flowing into MD-DC-VA.
See this PJM zone map to find the corresponding geographic areas that will either pay higher or lower prices if Transource's project is built.  This is a quick and easy way to demonstrate that the Transource project will cost money, real money, to electric consumers in non-benefiting zones.  And remember, PJM did not include these increases in costs in its calculation of "benefits."  Its almost as if the people in these zones don't exist... only the special people who will receive the lion's share of PJM's "benefit."

So, how much does the Transource project actually lower power prices overall in the PJM region (as if every consumer in every zone mattered equally).  $17.05M over 15 years.  If the increased power prices are subtracted from the decreased power prices, there's only $17.05M of savings left.
The net efficiency gains are the only true measure of the IEC Project’s benefit. The approach used by the Company assumes that the lower-cost power that flows into MD-DC-VA would not otherwise confer any economic benefit but for the construction of the IEC Project. In reality, though, that lower-cost power is being used in other regions of PJM (primarily Pennsylvania and New Jersey).  Thus, the benefits from the IEC Project should be measured as the reduction in power costs in MD-DC-VA, offset by the increase in power costs in regions like parts of Pennsylvania where power costs will increase.
And then the mushroom cloud appears that vaporizes any economic need for the project:
Q. If the IEC Project provides net benefits of $17 million over 15 years, should it be constructed?

A. No. As of September 2018, the estimated construction cost is $366 million, resulting in an estimated 15-year cost (PVRR) of $498 million. Thus, the IEC Project would cost significantly more than the benefits it would provide, resulting in a benefit-cost ratio of only 0.03. That is, for every dollar spent on the IEC Project, it would provide only three cents worth of benefits. Because the IEC Project is being built solely to reduce power costs, and not to provide any reliability benefits, the IEC Project is not economical and
should not be built.
So, if IEC is going to produce $17M in "benefits" over 15 years, how much is it going to cost again?  Even with PJM refusing to update the cost of the project since 2015, PJM's little revenue requirement number is $498M.  Let's say that's a cool half billion for argument's sake.  That's five hundred million dollars of your money spent in order to create a total of seventeen million dollars of overall benefit for all consumers in the region.

The real cost benefit ratio for the Transource project is 0.03, not the 1.4 PJM recently claimed after their own magic math analysis.  For every dollar you spend on this project, you will receive 3 cents in return value.  That's a loss of 97 cents on every dollar you pay for this project!  That's completely outrageous, PJM!  What the heck are you doing with my money?  Has PJM forgotten their purpose?  It's supposed to be for benefit of electric consumers in the region (ALL electric consumers, not just special ones).  However it now seems more like PJM works in a discriminatory fashion only for benefit of certain consumers.  Or maybe they only work for utility member financial gain.  One thing's for sure... PJM is not working for me!

And another thing... Rubin's testimony confirmed that PJM's cost allocations for the Transource project are set in stone at the time the project was originally approved in 2016.  Compare the cost allocation chart here with the new "benefit" chart above.  It is evident that some PJM zones that were originally assigned cost responsibility for this project because it appeared they benefited at that time are now going to end up with increased costs because of the project.  Not only do these utilities no longer benefit from a project they are forced to pay for, the project they pay for will increase their power costs!  It's like paying for a punch in the face.  As an example, let's look at the AEP zone, the first on the cost allocation list.  AEP will pay for 6.56% of Transource's currently estimated $500M cost.  That's nearly $33M dollars AEP customers will pay for the Transource IEC.  And what will they get in return for their money?  $5.3M of increased power bills.  Add it up and AEP zone customers will be paying an additional $38M in their electric bills and getting zip in return.  All cost, no benefit.  This is a stunning example of how badly PJM is failing at its job.  So, how bad is it?  Really bad, according to Rubin.
The IEC project would cost $498 million over 15 years, but it would lower power costs by only $17 million, resulting in a net loss to PJM utilities of more than $480 million. Thus, PJM as a whole would experience a net loss of $32 million per year for each of the first 15 years of the IEC Project. The Project is not economical for PJM’s utilities (and the consumers who purchase electricity from those utilities) and should not be constructed.
A little closer to home, Rubin makes the same kind of analysis including only Pennsylvania utilities (remember, the PUC works for Pennsylvanians, not PJM customers as a whole).
Thus, when including the costs of paying for the IEC Project, the net effect on Pennsylvania would be to have power costs increase by approximately $367 million over the next 15 years, or by more than $24 million per year.
Get that, Pennsylvania!  Your costs will only increase.  There is no "benefit" for Pennsylvania.  And PJM expects the PUC will approve this project?  Why should they?  No sane person pays to be punched in the face... or the wallet.

After reading this testimony, I'm pretty sure PJM's and Transource's facade of magic math, half-truths, and lies has worn completely through.  It's over.  Transource's project cannot be approved.  It's time to cancel this project, which is costing me more money every day this farce continues.
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PJM and Transource Attempt to Hustle Citizens With Doublespeak

9/19/2018

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In the wake of PJM's recent incomplete and inaccurate "analysis" of the cost benefit study for the Transource Independence Energy Connection, both PJM and Transource have been bloviating in the media about the relevance of their recent "findings."  It's almost like Tweedledee and Tweedledum got together to devise a new joint public relations strategy to assuage the public concern.  (And wouldn't that make for some interesting data requests!) 
Look, fellas, it's NOT WORKING.  I'm not sure who you were trying to kid with all that doublespeak, but it's only further enraged and inspired the public to speak out against the project (and now PJM) in opposition.

Let's start with Steve Herling's Op Ed in the York Dispatch, since it inspired a bunch of new public comment in opposition to the project yesterday in Franklin County.  Mr. Herling's Op Ed is a distinct contrast to what he said during the TEAC meeting on September 13.  But if you didn't attend that meeting (or listen in over the phone) you might not realize how much doublespeak it contains.

Mr. Herling starts out recognizing there is "public interest" in the project.  He thinks it's a recent development.  It's not, not at all.  The public has been concerned about this project since it was brought to their attention more than a year ago.  Opposition was overwhelming and immediate.  Mr. Herling just hasn't been paying attention until now, when it's becoming more of a likelihood that this project will be denied by the states.  Too little, too late, Mr. Herling!

Trying to explain PJM's purpose and the project's necessity to the public at this late stage is like trying to bail out the Titanic with a tea cup.  Good luck with that, but chances are the ship is going down and if you don't scurry to the lifeboat, you're going down with it.

Mr. Herling thinks he's making the electrical system efficient, economical and equitable (alliteration at its finest, probably not the work of Mr. Herling but some PR wordsmith).
After all, it would not be fair for customers in one area to consistently pay higher prices than others do simply because the system’s design prevented some customers from accessing the lowest-cost electricity.

For many years, some customers in the mid-Atlantic region, those in areas of Maryland, Northern Virginia and the District of Columbia, have had to pay comparatively higher prices than customers in other areas have, because bottlenecks in the interstate transmission system have not allowed an efficient flow of the lowest-cost power into the zone.

Oh no!  You really didn't say that, did you Mr. Herling?  Poor, poor, pitiful Washington DC and its affluent suburbs!  Because these special people don't want to have their air fouled by electric generators to serve their insatiable need for electricity, it's up to the folks in "the country" to foul their own air generating power for the cities, and then sacrifice their homes and businesses to new transmission corridors that ship it there.  All so those special folks in D.C. can save a few pennies on their monthly bills.  Maybe if D.C. stops wastefully keeping its cities lit up all night, they could save more than a few pennies (and there are other benefits that could happen in such a scenario, such as a dark night sky with actual stars in it)!  This argument falls completely flat in the sacrifice zone.  We already know we're politically disenfranchised from what goes on in D.C. and the stunning arrogance of telling us we need to sacrifice for them has been a galling lump in our throats for decades.  This argument convinces no one, probably not even these special people you're so concerned about.  The special people have closed all the dirty generators in their own region, believing what you tell them about others farther away that are happy to sacrifice to supply their needs.  We're not.  Haven't been for years. 

You mention the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission like they approved this project.  They did not.  It's not even on their radar.  FERC has nothing to do with transmission siting and permitting.  FERC's only jurisdiction is over interstate transmission rates, and that has not become an issue with Transource... yet.  FERC's jurisdiction does, however, extend to the actions of PJM.  FERC expects PJM to follow its own FERC-approved manuals and tariffs while it conducts its business.  Maybe Mr. Herling should look a little closer to home when talking about the authority of FERC, to make sure he's crossed all his t's and dotted all his i's.  What does PJM's operations manual say about annual re-evaluations of market efficiency projects... and what information must PJM include in just such an analysis?  Maybe Mr. Herling should be saving up his doublespeak for FERC.

And then he says this:
PJM recently completed its annual review of the Transource project. Our thorough analysis of the many factors that go into benefits and costs concluded that the benefits continue to justify the costs.

The analysis considered factors such as recent load and congestion forecasts, current cost estimates, power flow projections, topology, interregional modeling, future fuel prices and generation interconnections.

No, it did not.  At the meeting, Mr. Herling admitted that he did not have updated cost estimates for Transource's part of the IEC.  The cost increases used in the analysis only came from other utilities tasked with updating their substations for the addition of IEC.  IEC's costs have not been updated since 2015!  That is NOT "current cost estimates."  Mr. Herling said Transource is getting ready to put its project out for bid and when the bids are shared with PJM, it will update the costs.  But there's more to deriving a cost than just a bid on materials.  PJM must plug these costs into a formula to derive a revenue requirement for each of the first 15 years of the project.  The formula contains interest rates, operations and maintenance costs and many other factors that will also have to be adjusted to produce a realistic projected revenue requirement.  When Mr. Herling stated that PJM could update the costs after bids were received I do hope he was intending to complete the entire process.  And, even if he is, a transmission project like IEC is paid for over a period of 40 years, not 15.  PJM guesses at the "benefits" over 15 years, compares it to the costs, and then hopes that the other 25 years of project life will follow the same pattern.  What happens if PJM's projections are wrong?  Do we get our money back?  And what happens if IEC ends up costing more than the projected revenue requirement?  Will the company or PJM eat the excess?  Of course not!  We will.  We the ratepayers of PJM are asked to accept all the risk of inaccurate projections.

The issue of generation interconnections also came up at the TEAC meeting.  Mr. Herling admitted that PJM did not use recent retirements in its analysis, and did not include new generation either.*

And then there's the whole reliability issue that first appeared on PJM's analysis of September 13.
During our recent review, PJM found that the Transource project also will address significant reliability issues that are emerging on the regional transmission system, including the potential overload of a key high-voltage line that carries electricity across the Pennsylvania-Maryland border.

Without the additional transmission capacity provided by the Transource project, the system could face serious violations of federal reliability standards, which would require additional measures to address.

The only data PJM provided on this issue was a list of line and transformer overloads.  There were no dates on any of these possible violations.  The reliability issue was pushed to the very end of the meeting, where there wasn't any time for questions or discussion.  How very convenient!  Did PJM perform its duty here when presenting this issue?  No, it just ended the meeting promptly.  But I have lots of questions about this new development!  Are overloaded lines and transformers easily solved by rebuilds/replacements of aging components, or is a new transmission line the only solution?  If so, why the IEC project, which was never designed (or bid) as a reliability project?  There are distinct rules for new reliability projects, and simply re-purposing an unneeded market efficiency project is nowhere to be found.  If there are truly serious reliability problems developing, PJM has a duty to take immediate action to solve them.  What PJM should not do is sit idle and watch these violations develop and hope that a market efficiency project will solve them, especially when the market efficiency project is likely to be cancelled or denied.  Does Mr. Herling think if he ignores the reliability issues long enough that he can later say that a new transmission project (just like IEC) must be built to solve them, when action now to upgrade old components would solve the problem cheaper and faster?  This wouldn't be the first time PJM ignored old, failing components while pushing for a new transmission line to "solve" the problem.

And here's Mr. Herling repeating Transource's most recent lie:
The interstate high-voltage transmission system is a shared resource, and consumers including homeowners, tenants, businesses and industrial plants throughout the PJM footprint benefit from a robust network that provides reliable and affordable electricity across the region.
Aggressive AEP mouthpiece Toad Burns also had a version of this for reporters at yesterday's hearings in Franklin County.  Todd was quoted somewhere as saying he came to the hearings to listen.  I gotta call B.S. on that one... Todd had no interest in "listening" at hearings in Franklin County earlier this year.  I suspect that maybe he only came yesterday to perform for the press and utter this nonsensical statement about regional benefits.

The idea of new transmission in one part of PJM benefiting the entire region is one that has a long and tortured history in the courts.  Circa 2005, in order to set up a way to spread cost recovery for big projects over as many people as possible in order to make everyone's share less noticeable, PJM began using a "postage stamp" method of cost allocation for a suite of big projects code named "Project Mountaineer."  These four projects were intended to increase the export of coal-fired electricity from the Ohio Valley to eastern PJM cities by 5,000 MW.  Under the postage stamp method, every utility in PJM was assigned a portion of the costs based on its percentage of load for the prior year.  PJM and FERC reasoned that every part of the system received some benefit from these new projects in eastern PJM, although they could not quantify these benefits.  Some utilities in the western part of the region, who were paying a large percentage of the costs due to their load, believed they were not receiving a corresponding amount of benefit.  The case ended up before the 7th Circuit, who remanded it back to FERC (twice!) requiring FERC to quantify the benefits, at least roughly.  It never happened.  Instead, FERC and PJM devised a new cost allocation scheme where ultra high voltage projects (double-circuit 345kV, 500kV and 765kV) would be allocated 50% postage stamp and 50% DFAX, where cost causers and beneficiaries are assigned costs commensurate with their use of the project.  In one memorable analogy from the 7th Circuit's opinion, it was said:
The incidental‐benefits tail mustn’t be allowed to wag the primary‐benefits dog.
And this analogy holds true today in response to PJM's and Transource's bogus argument that citizens in York and Franklin counties benefited from some unnamed transmission project in Indiana several years ago.  Which project was that, exactly?  Or are you both just speaking in generalities in a doublespeak attempt to confuse people?  There's a whole new debate we can have over who benefits from certain projects, if you want to open that can of worms.  But, I don't think you do.  That debate has happened enough times already to give a judge nightmares, and the outcome does not support your new, bogus argument.

The fact of the matter is that York County does not benefit at all from the IEC.  Not one penny!  And it probably didn't benefit from a project in Indiana either.  Whether or not Franklin County benefits from the IEC is debatable.  Have PJM's cost allocations changed in relation to the IEC's cost/benefit analysis?  No, they haven't.  And they won't.  The cost responsibility analysis is locked in time, although if updated today it may have very different results.  And here's the ultimate bottom line... Franklin County does not benefit anywhere near commensurate with the sacrifice it is being asked to make.

Mr. Herling says stakeholders need to "understand" the project's purpose and benefits.  As if maybe they finally "understood," then opposition would subside?  Fat chance, Mr. Herling.  Your attempt at the Information Deficit technique doesn't work.  It is precisely because the "stakeholders" DO understand the rhetoric and hubris of PJM, and the profit-seeking motives of Transource, that they oppose this project.  And these stakeholders aren't going away.  They're going to be in your face until you do the right thing.

About the only thing in Mr. Herling's opinion I can agree with is that applications for the Transource project are now under consideration by the Maryland Public Service Commission and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.  And I believe the commissions also fully "understand" what this project is about.  Ultimately, the states have the final say here, and you're not helping yourself out by saying one thing and doing another, and ignoring a recent PA-PUC Order for Transource to update its costs before your recent analysis.  That was a pretty bold move.  Don't think the regulators are buying your doublespeak.

And, ultimately, because of PJM's refusal to acknowledge that the IEC isn't going to happen, it's enabling Transource to run up our tab unnecessarily.  The one thing missing from Mr. Herling's Op Ed is the fact that PJM serves consumers, not member utilities.  Guess Mr. Herling needs to "understand" that.

*For discussion of FSA's see recent RTO Insider article.  We'll tentatively believe their reporting on this issue, although they somehow missed the elephant stampeding through the meeting room trumpeting about there being no update of Transource's costs for the project.  It wasn't even mentioned.  Maybe RTO Insider's perspective is a bit off here, judging from the text it included on its Facebook post touting the article yesterday.  "In a rare occurrence, half a dozen residents opposed to PJM's largest-ever congestion-reducing transmission project attended last week's Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee..." -- complete with photo of the creatures in action.  Sort of reminds me of the hushed narrative you hear on nature films about creatures doing their thing while unaware they're being observed and talked about by superior creatures.  Perhaps like the infamous honey badger footage...  *warning, strong language*
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PJM Doesn't Have All The Pieces To Its Process Puzzle

9/14/2018

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We've been hearing for months that PJM would be re-evaluating the Transource Independence Energy Connection and would be releasing its results at the September Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee meeting yesterday.  But that's not really what PJM did.

The afternoon before the meeting, PJM released its "analysis."  The analysis supposedly found that the project was still providing enough "benefits" to continue, with a cost-benefit ratio of 1.42.  That means for every dollar spent, the project would return $1.42 of "benefit" for PJM consumers.  Never take PJM at face value.  Ask questions, because the devil is in the details.

And that's just what IEC opponents from Maryland and Pennsylvania did yesterday when they attended PJM's TEAC meeting in person.  Patti Hankins, Aimee O'Neill, Dolores Krick and Greg Goss asked pertinent questions and let PJM know that the IEC was a gigantic waste of time and money, and that there were better, cheaper alternatives.

And our heroes from StopTransource weren't the only ones giving IEC the hairy eyeball.  There were plenty of others questioning PJM's re-evaluation process at the meeting, including regulators and other utilities.  And it was slowly revealed during the meeting that PJM did not include much of the necessary data to make its re-evaluation meaningful.  It was a total waste of time and effort and the result was useless.  PJM said it had to "put a stake in the ground" and conduct the re-evaluation at this certain point in time.  However, PJM did not have all the data it needed to perform a meaningful evaluation.  How stupid and wasteful is that?

Here's what's missing from PJM's re-evaluation:
  1. Generation retirements.  Early in the meeting PJM recited a list of retiring generators.  And wouldn't you know it, there's a bunch of new retirements in southwestern Pennsylvania.  When asked, PJM said it had not included any of that information in its analysis of the IEC.  Let's see... the retirement of over 4,000 MW of generation in Pennsylvania won't have any effect on the economics of new transmission to bring "cheaper" power from Pennsylvania to Washington, D.C.?  Of course it will!!  Less generation coming from Western PA means less generation available to ship to D.C., and generation prices will be affected.  Including this information won't do IEC any favors, so PJM simply ignored it.  Remember, stake in the ground, so anything that happens after stake is placed is completely ignored.  How convenient!
  2. New generation.  There was a bunch of incomprehensible discussion about inclusion of FSA's, and an expected Order from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that will require PJM to include FSA's in its modeling.  It seemed to be implied that inclusion of FSA's might change the re-evaluation numbers and obviate IEC.  What's a FSA?  Facility Service Agreement.  A proposed new generator must go through a series of studies at PJM before it is permitted to connect to the system to make sure it doesn't cause problems.  At the end of the study process, a generator signs an ISA (Interconnection Service Agreement) or FSA before connecting.  But PJM excludes these proposed generators from its evaluation data, pretending that they will never be built or connect within the 15-year future used to evaluate market efficiency transmission projects.  Would the connection of new generators closer to Washington, D.C. affect the need to ship generation all the way from Pennsylvania to serve that load?  Of course it will!  So, PJM isn't paying attention to any changes to generators when it evaluates market efficiency projects, although the existence and location of generators is the basis of need for a market efficiency project.  How convenient!
  3. Costs of the IEC.  Here's a big one!  In order to make an effective cost-benefit ratio calculation, you'd think PJM would have to have accurate costs, right?  Wrong!  PJM posted an updated cost estimate for the project that increased cost around $25M.  However, upon questioning, PJM revealed that the increased costs came from other transmission owners who were required to make improvements to their own systems to support IEC.  The costs of IEC have not been updated since 2015!  So PJM is using a cost number that has no validity to make its cost-benefit analysis!  If the cost number increases (and it will) the cost-benefit ratio will change.  PJM says it is still waiting for Transource to update its costs, but you know, stake in the ground, they just went ahead and wasted a bunch of time and money doing their evaluation with inaccurate cost data.
This is absurd, PJM!!!  It's bad enough you didn't use good data to do your stake in the ground analysis, but then you announced your inaccurate results like they actually meant something!  The new cost-benefit ratio of 1.42 means absolutely nothing.  What a colossal waste of time and money!  And whose money is PJM wasting doing stupid stuff like this?  Yours and mine.  PJM has no revenue of its own.  It collects its entire budget from consumers who pay an electric bill in the PJM region.  Every day the IEC farce goes on also costs us money because IEC has received an "incentive" that allows it to apply at the FERC to recover every dollar spent on the project (plus 10.4% interest) from ratepayers even if the project is cancelled.  The more Transource spends, the more it makes!

PJM claims it is hostage to its own process.  Once it orders a market efficiency project, it cannot cancel it unless the cost-benefit ratio falls below 1.25.  PJM claims it has no authority to require cost updates by certain deadlines that synchronize with its stake in the ground re-analysis.  Nor does it spend much effort attempting to verify any cost updates it does receive.  Therefore it appears that a transmission owner can never update its costs, can fudge any cost update it does submit, and effectively prevent PJM from canceling any market efficiency project.
Transource also wants to pretend it's trapped in PJM's Hotel California.  It was ordered, ORDERED, to construct this project and it must continue to do so until PJM cancels it!  However Transource isn't running for the door.  It's barricaded itself in its room and is ordering pink champagne on ice on our tab.

PJM also wanted everyone to note that there are now supposed reliability violations when IEC is removed from the transmission expansion plan.  Oh, c'mon!  This isn't how PJM plans for reliability, and IEC was never selected to solve reliability violations.  If there's a reliability issue, PJM needs to go back to the drawing board and find the best solution, not simply recycle one that now has no other purpose.  Was pretending that IEC is now needed for reliability supposed to scare state regulators into going along with the plan?  You're a day late and a dollar short on that, PJM.  I'm thinking that all this nonsense is simply increasing entrenched opposition at the state level.  Nobody likes to be lied to, especially state regulators.

Somebody needs to step in here and protect consumers from this nonsense.  That role falls on state regulators.  Yes, they're currently involved in a permitting process, but state regulators in the past have rescued consumers from this hell by requiring updated modeling and analysis that uses actual new data.  Until that happens, it looks like its up to the consumers themselves to stay on PJM to demand better analysis and I'm pretty sure they will.

The Transource IEC is nothing but a cost burden right now and the sooner it's cancelled, the less we're going to have to pay for PJM's process failure.
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U.S. DOE Wastes Your Money on Another Stupid Idea

6/8/2018

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Analysts report that consumers served by utilities on the nation's East and West coasts pay higher costs for their electricity than we do here.
News flash!  That's because "here" (the Midwest) doesn't have a network of expensive, gigantic transmission lines to pay for.

Think about it.

DOE obviously hasn't.

DOE is stuck in 2009, when the idea to lower coastal power prices by building a "national grid" was novel.  Now that idea can only be called FAILED.

So, the DOE has a big new idea for "the installation of a network of high-voltage, direct-current transmission lines could boost the availability of reliable, affordable power generated by renewable sources at load centers on the East and West coasts."

Hey, Einstein, building your ginormous dream grid costs money.  Lots and lots and lots of money.  We're talking billions.  And your plan expects that electric customers nationwide will finance that investment over decades to come and pay its private investors/owners double-digit interest throughout its lifetime.  No thanks, we simply can't afford it.

Don't you think that adding additional costs to move energy thousands of miles will only increase energy prices, both on the coasts and the Midwest?  Building new transmission to reduce costs on one part of the system only produces a leveling of costs across the region.  If prices go down on the coast, they will increase in the Midwest.

And maybe, just maybe, the people who live in the Midwest don't want to live in an ugly, noisy, industrial power plant that only benefits the politically powerful players on the coasts.  And maybe they don't want to live in and work under a network of new high voltage transmission lines.  And they will resist, no maybe about it.  They will shout and block and delay your dream grid for years and years, and that costs even more money.

Don't do it, DOE.  Quit wasting my tax money on stupid things like TransGrid-X 2030.  You already tried this idea once, remember?  You called it Section 1222 of the Energy Policy Act, and you decided to "partner" on an HVDC transmission line from the Oklahoma panhandle to Memphis.  And it failed.  It failed spectacularly.  It couldn't find any customers to purchase capacity.  No income, no project.  So what makes you think, DOE, that a new network of HVDC transmission lines from the Midwest to the coasts would be able to find customers?  You've already done this experiment once and it failed.

I do note that your "symposium" has participation from companies that would benefit financially from building billions of dollars of new transmission.  So you're just acting as a facilitator for private investment here?

Swamp, swampy, swamperson.  Get out of the muck!  Don't you have enough trouble already with your swampy plan to save coal?

The real cutting edge on transmission is to stop building it and develop a secure system of interconnected local microgrids that can be autonomous self-contained systems that continue working seamlessly whether connected to a larger network or not.

Or maybe you can hold a seance and ask Nikola Tesla what he thinks?  That's probably a more productive use of my tax money.

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AEP Wind Catcher Support Letters to Oklahoma Corporation Commission Signed by AEP Employees

5/29/2018

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What's a company to do when it wants to create a feeling of overwhelming support for regulatory approval of one of its projects, but it lacks overwhelming support?

Create it with home-grown resources!

Shame on you, AEP!  Your scam wasn't even that hard to figure out.  Which ever one of your "geniuses" came up with passing the tablet in the workplace ought to be fired.

At the very least, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission should be forced to collect and toss any letters of support for the Wind Catcher project that came from AEP/PSO employees and failed to disclose that the author worked for AEP and had a conflict of interest.  That should lighten the docket immensely. 

A little birdie told me that the OCC Commissioners were looking at huge piles of support letters for the Wind Catcher project on their desks.  Perhaps Commissioners were feeling a bit obligated to approve the project's rate scheme because of such overwhelming support.  So, I looked at the OCC docket for the case.  And I found one of the links to collections of public comment on the project.

Funny that... most of the letters were strikingly similar, in fact so similar that they are obviously form letters.  All contain the following  closing paragraph:
For the aforementioned reasons, I sincerely support and endorse Wind Catcher Energy Connection and the benefits that it will bring to Oklahoma. Oklahoma cannot afford to miss out on this opportunity to invest in our state and the citizens of Oklahoma. I would like to thank the Oklahoma Corporation Commission for their thoughtful consideration on this matter.
And they are all obviously signed on an electronic tablet because each individual signature has that telltale "drunken illiterate" look so common to finger signatures on electronic tablets, where the signature box is well defined and limited.

So, who was collecting signatures in support of the project?  Was it some of the usual suspects like Sierra Club?  Well, yes, of course, but an online letter does not create a distinctive tablet signature, and there's no way Sierra Club could draw that many people to a venue in order to sign their tablet.  Sierra Club is no longer a member run organization and has lost its base because it is too focused on scoring grant money anymore.  Who else is running a "send a support letter to the OCC" campaign for Wind Catcher?  Well, Invenergy is.  That's sort of like cheating though, since Invenergy stands to profit enormously if AEP gets its project approved and buys Invenergy's wind farm.  Shame on you, Invenergy!  But even then, how could tablet signatures get generated online?  And why doesn't Invenergy's form letter of support include the telltale concluding paragraph?

Where were these "supporters" gathered?

I tested my first theory that all "supporters" from a certain date may all live in one city and may have attended a single public event where the tablet was passed.  Since the OCC blocked out the addresses of the "supporters" I had to zero in on unique or unusual names to find out what cities the supporters lived in.

And then I found something really interesting.

Kristine Kurszewski.

She supports Wind Catcher.

She's also an Administrative Assistant at Public Service Company of Oklahoma at Bartlesville.

Wow, what a coincidence, right?  Out of all those dozens of support letters docketed at the OCC I just happened to pick one written by an AEP employee.

Except then there was:

Tiney Holyfield, a Project Control Analyst at American Electric Power in Oklahoma City.

Larry Gattenby, an IT Support Technician for AEP.

Levi Grooms, a Project Manager for AEP in Tulsa.

And lots more, but it was starting to get repetitive. 

It looks like all Wind Catcher's "support" letters were signed by AEP/PSO employees across Oklahoma.  What better place to walk around with a tablet and get employees to give you a finger signature?  I wonder if the employees even knew they were signing a support letter to the OCC?  Or did they think they were signing some routine workplace form?  How voluntary were these signatures, anyhow?  Did employees feel pressured to sign the tablet?  I think AEP has a lot of explaining to do to the OCC...

It also needs to fess up to jamming the docket with fake letters of support from its employees.  Once all those fake form letters are gone, the letters of opposition will rise and shine.  They're in there, but buried among the AEP employee form letters so only a very patient person would be able to locate them.

If the OCC Commissioners have piles of support letters on their desks, they need to weed out any written by AEP employees, whose employment may or may not be tied to their willingness to sign AEP's tablet.  Such "support" cannot be seriously considered as reason for approving such a bad project.

Shame on you, AEP!  SHAME ON YOU!!!
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Your Renewable Energy Goals Are Not My Problem

5/2/2018

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It's politically correct for everyone to have renewable energy goals these days.  From corporations to governments, everyone wants to look like they're doing their part to make energy cleaner.  But what about when you're not really doing your part and instead trying to force other people to do your part for you?  It's all well and good to take personal responsibility for your environmental footprint, but not so much when your efforts include making your environmental footprint someone else's problem.  If you demand that the power you consume must be greener, shouldn't you be willing to sacrifice to get there?

The politically correct and politically connected are increasingly demanding that their environmental goals must be met through the sacrifice of others.  Maybe we shouldn't blame them for their selfishness.  Perhaps they earned it honestly over the years because the sacrifice of others to provide the energy that powers their bastions of urban utopia was never questioned or opposed. 

"West Virginia?  Oh, those poor folks like coal and pollution because it provides jobs.  Put all the power plants, transmission lines and other undesirable infrastructure there.  They don't mind."

But now maybe they do mind.  So now you think, "Let's clean up our environment and stop buying dirty stuff from there!  Let's buy clean energy from somewhere else!"

How about you make your own energy... for once?  How about you build a power generator in your own neighborhood?  But that's too costly, you say, there's not enough space for new power generators, and besides, you don't want energy infrastructure in our own back yards!

Exactly.  So what makes you think others do?  Especially when the others won't receive any benefit from your infrastructure?  Oh sure, the renewable energy enthusiasts and the companies who make money hand over fist meeting their needs try to pretend areas hosting new energy infrastructure will "benefit" from new projects.  But that's all they present -- trumped up benefits with absolutely no mention of all the local detriments that come with this infrastructure.  Payments to local governments or environmental groups are nothing more than dirty hush money.  That money will run out soon, but the detriments will be permanent.

Big wind is destroying rural middle America, turning it into an industrial wasteland and fomenting bitter animosity that destroys formerly peaceful communities.  And what for?  So they can export the idea of wind power to urban communities, and make a bundle of tax dollars in the process.  When the handouts stop, so will the push for Midwest wind, but by that time, what will be left?

Eastern states with renewable energy goals are calling for more "clean" power, and the companies who build transmission are only too happy to offer it to them.  Instead of building clean generators in their own communities, certain states want to import it from some far off golden renewable land where they don't have to make any sacrifice to produce it.  I'm talking about you, Massachusetts.

First it was Northern Pass, which promised to bring "renewable" hydro power from Canada.  Massachusetts doesn't connect with Canada, therefore Northern Pass suggested stomping through New Hampshire on its way south, like Godzilla on his way to Tokyo.  Except New Hamphire refused to be the sacrificial lamb for Massachusetts needs.  So now it's "New England Clean Energy Connect," another aerial transmission project that uses Maine as the sacrificial lamb.  Central Maine Power says Maine doesn't mind, and in fact many towns and business groups have "endorsed" the project.  Everything's good, right?  Maine loves making a sacrifice to its own environment and economic prospects in order to meet Massachusetts renewable energy goals.  Well, maybe not.  It's not so easy...
But Maine regulators must find that NECEC will benefit Maine residents, even though none of its electricity will be sold in Maine. Additionally, the project’s direct-current design restricts instate generators — such as wind or solar farms — from hooking up to the line.
It's deja vu all over again.  One state is being asked to sacrifice for the needs of another.  And we're not just talking about bringing in power to keep the lights on in that other state, we're talking about bringing in "cleaner" power so that the other state can continue to use as much as it wants without harming their delicate environmental conscience.  And just like the last project, there is opposition.

And some of this opposition has a different character.
But opponents, which include national energy companies that own competing power plants, say the project could force their plants offline, costing jobs, tax revenue and the ability to build new wind and solar projects in Maine.
And national energy companies have a lot of resources to refute the murky claims of benefit being offered by project owner, Central Maine Power.  Such as:
• Maine power plants, including Wyman Station in Yarmouth, could close, and hundreds of jobs and more than $5 million in property tax revenue would be lost.
• Several Maine wind and solar projects could be canceled, too, because the line would be designed like an interstate highway from Canada with no on-ramps in Maine for other generated power.
• Despite being labeled a clean project, the line wouldn’t really lower carbon emissions that accelerate climate change because no new hydropower facilities would be built, meaning fossil-fuel power plants outside New England would be called on to backfill demand in New York state and elsewhere created by the diversion of power to Massachusetts.

And those claims that construction of the project will lower electric costs throughout the region, including Maine, are also being challenged.
Asked Tuesday to clarify the $40 million savings to Maine ratepayers, John Carroll, an Avangrid spokesman, said an analysis done for the company attempts to quantify the “downward pressure” on energy prices in the wholesale markets. The effect, he said, is similar to using less of a higher-cost fuel to meet electric demand; it produces lower prices for consumers.
In the testimony, opponents acknowledge that the project could “suppress” wholesale electric rates at first. But Tanya Bodell, executive director at Energyzt Advisors LLC in Boston, said that falling prices associated with other planned renewable generation projects would soon negate the impact of the new transmission line.

Let's be real here, shall we?  This project doesn't benefit Maine, it benefits Massachusetts.  And when this proposal also fails, will Massachusetts move on to the next?  Or will they finally take responsibility for meeting their own ambitious goals?

Transmission projects that visit the "needs" of one state or geographic region on the beauty and economic prosperity of another are doomed to failure.  We're not all a bunch of short-sighted bumpkins who will swoon over a pile of shiny beads.  That only happens in history books.

The only kind of transmission project that stands a chance anymore is one like this.  Completely buried along public rights of way or underwater.  Why hasn't Massachusetts selected one like that?  Because supplying Massachusetts with renewable energy is cost competitive, and doing the right thing costs too much.  When you set your renewable energy goals, Massachusetts, did you think it would be cheap?  Did you think it was going to be easy to visit your needs on other states?  It's not.  You set your goals, you need to meet them at your own expense.  Your goals = your problem.
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    About the Author

    Keryn Newman blogs here at StopPATH WV about energy issues, transmission policy, misguided regulation, our greedy energy companies and their corporate spin.
    In 2008, AEP & Allegheny Energy's PATH joint venture used their transmission line routing etch-a-sketch to draw a 765kV line across the street from her house. Oooops! And the rest is history.

    About
    StopPATH Blog

    StopPATH Blog began as a forum for information and opinion about the PATH transmission project.  The PATH project was abandoned in 2012, however, this blog was not.

    StopPATH Blog continues to bring you energy policy news and opinion from a consumer's point of view.  If it's sometimes snarky and oftentimes irreverent, just remember that the truth isn't pretty.  People come here because they want the truth, instead of the usual dreadful lies this industry continues to tell itself.  If you keep reading, I'll keep writing.


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