The plan would require Central Maine Power and Emera Maine to sell all transmission and distribution assets to the proposed Maine Power Delivery Authority. Bill supporters said the authority would use low-interest revenue bonds to make the multibillion-dollar purchase, allowing the new consumer-owned utility to provide electricity to most Maine residents at lower rates than those charged by the two investor-owned utilities.

The proposal is, in part, a response to the controversies that have dogged CMP since an October 2017 windstorm left some customers without power for more than a week, as well as massive bill spikes reported by thousands of customers.

“Maine people want and deserve a utility that will keep the costs down and the lights on and put its Maine customers and workers first,” said Berry, the co-chairman of the Legislature’s Energy, Utilities and Technology Committee. “Our current utilities have failed us in every respect, with the clear exception of our own consumer-owned utilities.”

...the state create[s] a nonprofit, consumer-owned transmission and distribution utility, and have it take over CMP and Emera’s assets and operations.

“A Maine power delivery utility that purchases at a fair price the assets of CMP and Emera Maine, and shakes their hands and says, respectfully, ‘goodbye,’” he says.

That could cost at least $4 billion, the value of the combined CMP and Emera assets according to 2017 filings with state regulators. Berry says it would be affordable though, because the state would float revenue bonds to finance the purchases — bonds that are not taxed by the federal government.
“This is not magic, it’s not sleight of hand. We are refinancing at different interest rates. That’s all it is, and that’s how we would reduce rates,” he says.

And Berry says that in addition to the debt-cost savings, ratepayers in the newly created Maine Power Delivery Authority would also benefit because their rates would no longer have to return profits to private investors — returns that routinely rise over 10 percent in Maine. That tax savings and the lack of a the need to generate profits for shareholders, he estimates, would cut electricity delivery rates by 15 percent while improving service reliability.

CMP spokeswoman Catherine Hartnett said few details of Berry’s bill – which is still in the legislative drafting office – have been released but the company has “strong concerns about the state seizing private property.” Hartnett questioned how the proposed authority would match the professional experience and on-the-ground knowledge of CMP workers.

“Every time it has come up before (in the Legislature), it has been rejected first of all because of the questionable benefits, but also because of the constitutional issues,” Hartnett said.

In 2012, the developers of a proposed transmission line between West Virginia and Maryland sought to recover $121.5 million the company had spent before grid operators decided the $2.1 billion project was no longer needed.
FERC later told the utilities they were ineligible for at least $7 million of the $121.5 million requested, including $6.2 million in advocacy, advertising and lobbying expenses.

There is significant uncertainty and risk to the Project due to its scope, size and long lead times, and because the Project requires approval from Iowa, Wisconsin and multiple federal agencies. In particular, there is a risk that the federal agencies may select a different river crossing than that authorized by the IUB or the PSCW. If this occurs, there is a risk of additional delay that may threaten the ability of the Project to move forward.
The Project also involves multiple owners which requires coordination. In addition, the Project may face challenges and objections in the easement acquisition process in Iowa.

These approvals and permits are not guaranteed to be granted, and the Project could be delayed or terminated, or the final route changed, if ATC is unable to obtain any of these approvals or permits. In particular, the federal agencies may select a different Mississippi River crossing than that authorized by the IUB or the PSCW, which could delay or result in termination of the Project.

The scope, size, cost, long-lead times and participation by multiple owners pose  inherent risks for the Project. As my description of the Project makes clear, the size, scope and complexity of the Project – involving approximately 102- to 120-miles of new 345 kV transmission line and a new substation and related facilities, spanning multiple states and jurisdictions, crossing the Mississippi River, with multiple owners for a cost of approximately $492 Million to $543 Million – is significant. Further, the easement acquisition process may be contentious, resulting in delays or increased costs.

The MLA respectfully contends that the type of “need” created by Grain Belt in inducing MJMEUC to buy its product is not a true “need” for the service in the sense envisioned in the Tartan case. By analogy, it seems safe to say that not every family in Jefferson City truly “needs” to own a Cadillac. But if a dealer were for some reason to offer a Cadillac to everyone in the City for say $5.00, would the fact that virtually every family in the City was now driving a Cadillac suddenly prove there really was a “need” for those cars after all?

To the contrary, the MLA submits that actual “need” for any product cannot be artificially created by practically giving it away, as Grain Belt has done here. “Need” is not the same as “Want”.

To begin with, the only meaningful means to determine what MJMEUC might have saved by using the Grain Belt line is to compare MJMEUC’s total cost of power from that line to MJMEUC’s next best alternative at the time it signed the contract with Grain Belt. The problem is, before MJMEUC signed the TSA with Grain Belt, it did not bother to solicit bids from any other party to replace the expiring Illinois coal contract. Therefore, neither MJMEUC nor anyone else will ever know what the best alternative would have been to signing the TSA with Grain Belt.

For the above reasons, the MLA respectfully submits that Grain Belt failed to prove that the need for the line in Missouri is anything but an illusion of its own making.

In short, all of the cases cited by Grain Belt on this issue merely support the reliance on the resources of Clean Line, and not those of a third party with no ownership in the Applicant.  Thus based on Grain Belt’s own analysis, it is asking the Commission to take a position here for which there apparently is no precedent.

A more fundamental problem with Grain Belt’s argument on this point is that it is once again taking for granted that future decisions of the Commission will be made in Grain Belt’s favor. Specifically, before the sale of Grain Belt to Invenergy may close, those parties need not only the CCN in this proceeding, but also the permission of the Commission for the sale of the Grain Belt project to Invenergy in a case which has yet to be filed. If that sale is not approved, then of course Grain Belt never gains access to the resources of Invenergy. Thus in asking the Commission to decide the two Tartan criteria on the basis of Invenergy’s expertise and stronger financial status, they are necessarily asking the Commission to assume that it will later approve the sale of Grain Belt to Invenergy. And this request is being made by Grain Belt before the Commission has even seen or heard a word of evidence in the case which will decide that issue.

This is particularly presumptuous on Grain Belt’s part, in that they have stated unequivocally that the Commission does not even have the authority to approve the proposed sale which they now take for granted will be approved.

Even if Grain Belt successfully manages to disavow its earlier position, which seems unlikely, it is totally inappropriate for Grain Belt to even suggest to the Commission that it should assume it will approve the sale of Grain Belt to Invenergy before that case is even filed.

Despite the prognoses of what the Commission will do in some unfiled case, as matters now stand there is no basis for granting a CCN to the Applicant on the basis of speculation about its possible access to Invenergy’s resources.

Grain Belt supports its position on this issue primarily with broad generalizations about the market for wind generation. And while it contends that “the economic feasibility of the Project continues to be strong”, it does not even attempt to make a case for the economic feasibility of the Missouri segment of the line, without access to the PJM market.

As the MLA and Show Me discussed in their initial brief on remand, there is a definite possibility that the line will ultimately terminate in Missouri, thereby precluding access to the very markets which could make the project economically feasible.

As the NRDC and Sierra Club suggest, Missouri might be a “loss leader” for Grain Belt. But as they then note, according to the concurring opinion the project relies for its economic viability on the higher prices in the PJM market. But of course if the project cannot reach the PJM market, it is left only with the loss leader segment of the line in Missouri.

We find discrepancies between the General Advertising amounts reclassified by PATH in its Compliance Filings compared to the General Advertising amounts the Commission required PATH to reclassify in Opinion No. 554.

On compliance, PATH must eliminate all General Advertising costs from its recoverable amounts, or else specifically justify each item in light of Opinion No. 554.  In making the compliance filing, PATH must provide the journal entries to reflect the adjustments, and workpapers necessary to explain the accounting corrections for that FERC Form No. 1 input that references back to the journal entries; and the revised/corrected draft Form No. 1 inputs.

Did you make a compliance filing, PATH?

No!  We don't need to!  We made an informational filing!

Are you sure you don't need to make a compliance filing, PATH?

No!  FERC meant an informational filing, not a compliance filing!

Where's our $70M?

PATH must submit a compliance filing with the Commission describing either:  (1) its plan for ending its operations and a timeline for when it intends to file a notice of cancellation of its transmission formula rates, or (2) the type of “transmission or sale of electric energy” that requires its rates to stay in effect.  We direct PATH to submit this compliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order.  To the extent that PATH intends to unwind, PATH must make the appropriate filings under FPA section 205, as necessary, to implement this action.  PATH shall notify the Commission within 10 days of the date that the closing out of business is complete.

“Underground is about 10 times more expensive than overhead,” said Malashenko, who is the PUC safety and enforcement division director. “If we were to underground (throughout) California, all our rates would go up ten times.”

In addition, given its responses to data requests and Transource’s filings in the Pennsylvania proceeding, it appears that Transource is modifying its position as to the need for and benefits of the Project from a straightforward purpose of lowering some customers’ electricity costs as a “market efficiency project” to now asserting other benefits associated with emerging reliability concerns. However, if PJM has now determined that there are reliability concerns and an associated need for transmission system enhancements, it would be more appropriate to first investigate reasonable alternatives within the relevant PJM processes rather than latching solutions on to this discretionary market efficiency project.

Furthermore, even though PJM’s market efficiency processes do not incorporate Maryland statutes, it is incumbent on the Applicant to meet the State’s requirements for a CPCN by presenting alternatives to the Project that use existing lines. The PJM process is not a substitute for Maryland’s statutory requirements and its determination that a project is the most effective solution should not allow that project to circumvent Maryland’s comprehensive siting process.

TDI, from the very beginning, took important community, environmental and aesthetic considerations into account when designing and siting the NECPL. TDI carefully chose underground technology specifically to minimize impacts on the people, viewshed and environment of Vermont. We recognized that the additional expense related to underground construction for NECPL was worth the alleviation of a multitude of genuine community and environmental concerns, and that the cost of any project can’t only be measured in dollars.

The MMU recommends that PJM reevaluate the rules governing cost benefit analysis and cost allocation for economic projects. (Priority: Medium. New recommendation. Status: Not adopted.)

The MMU recommends the creation of a mechanism to permit a direct comparison, or competition, between transmission and generation alternatives, including which alternative is less costly and who bears the risks associated with each alternative. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.)

Differences in CLMP among eastern, southern and western control zones in PJM were primarily a result of congestion on the AEP - DOM Interface, the Cloverdale Transformer, the Tanners Creek - Miami Fort Flowgate, the Graceton - Safe Harbor Line, and the 5004/5005 Interface.
The AEP - DOM Interface was the largest contributor to congestion costs in the first nine months of 2018. With $120.4 million in total congestion costs, it accounted for 10.8 percent of the total PJM congestion costs in the first nine months of 2018.