Slick Willie is a term that, upon hearing it, is understood to mean something uncomplimentary towards the person to whom it refers.  Those who are called Slick Willies are cunning and deceptive people who are superficially appealing and polished, but who are shallow and glib, and able to deftly execute convincing arguments that favors the con man and defrauds the mark.

To my ear, that backstory "so" is merely a little geeky, but it rouses some critics to keening indignation. A BBC host says speakers use it to sound important and intellectual. A columnist at Fast Company warns that it undermines your credibility. A psychologist writes that it's a weasel word that people use to avoid giving a straight answer.

For Rate Year 2008 through Rate Year 2015, PATH has calculated that refunds, with interest, will amount to $18,633,124.

Based on PJM’s assessment of the contribution to the need for, and benefits expected to be derived from, the facilities, the zonal percentage cost allocation for 2017 (January 1, 2017 through April 15, 2017) is...

Opposition to Va. Tx Line May Trigger Unintended Consequences

Sometimes the juice isn’t worth the squeeze.

Protesters of a 500-kV transmission line across the James River might soon learn that the hard way. PJM is responding to the delay in the project’s approval by instituting a multilayered strategy likely to hurt ratepayers in Virginia’s middle peninsula disproportionate to any perceived benefits that could come from blocking construction of the line.

At a series of committee meetings last week, PJM staff detailed several other changes for the area that will have consequences protesters likely haven’t imagined.

Acting as a neutral, independent party, PJM operates a competitive wholesale electricity market and manages the high-voltage electricity grid to ensure reliability for more than 65 million people.

PJM works closely with stakeholders throughout the development of the RTEP. Stakeholder input is a key part of the PJM planning process. The Skiffes Creek project was reviewed in numerous open meetings of the PJM Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee where public comment was sought prior to approval of the project by the PJM Board. As part of that process, Dominion transmission staff provided PJM its own thorough and comprehensive analysis of system needs as well as potential solutions for PJM consideration. Most importantly however, the Dominion analysis, which itself was based on PJM’s initial determination of reliability criteria violations that needed to be addressed, was then independently validated by PJM and publicly vetted through the PJM stakeholder process prior to PJM recommending Board approval of the Skiffes Creek project.

Grain Belt has again failed to establish that its proposed project is needed in Missouri in the sense required by the first of the five Tartan criteria.  In the 2014 Grain Belt case, No. EA-2014-0207, the Commission rejected Grain Belt’s application for a CCN in part at least because it failed to prove that the proposed line would provide any service to customers in Missouri. As it indicated: “The Commission concludes that GBE has failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the service it proposes in its application for a certificate of convenience and necessity is needed in Missouri.”

After the Order was issued in that case, Grain Belt made a concerted effort to correct that deficiency. It made sales presentations to a number of load-serving utilities in Missouri, including Ameren Missouri, Consolidated Electric Cooperative, and a number of individual municipal systems in this state. None of those efforts were successful, including Grain Belt’s initial overtures to MJMEUC.

Eventually, however, Grain Belt discounted the price of its transmission capacity to MJMEUC to the point where MJMEUC conditionally accepted their offer in a Transmission Service Agreement (TSA) dated June 2, 2016. Under what Grain Belt calls a “first mover” rate, MJMEUC was handed the unique opportunity to purchase an initial 100 MW of capacity from Grain Belt at only $1,167 per MW per month. A second 100 MWs was offered for just $1,667 per MW per month. In contrast, Grain Belt’s “normal” rate for that identical service from Kansas to Missouri is $5,670 per MW per month, or nearly 5 times the discounted rate offered to MJMEUC for its initial 100 MWs.

Grain Belt now touts the contract as the “most significant” milestone they have achieved since their rejection in the 2014 case. In reality, Grain Belt’s inability to attract any customers for its line left it no choice but to buy its way into Missouri.

But even this discounted contract with MJMEUC does not assure the Commission that power from the Grain Belt line will actually be used by customers in Missouri. A number of Grain Belt witnesses have testified that MJMEUC agreed to purchase up to 200 MW of service into Missouri – or comparable language implying that MJMEUC has actually committed to buy capacity on the proposed line. But the fact is that MJMEUC has not committed to buy any capacity on the Grain Belt line.

MJMEUC is not obligated to decide how much capacity it will actually buy until about 60 days before the line becomes energized. Assuming that Grain Belt is finally accurate in forecasting the in-service date of its project, that means that MJMEUC will have nearly 4 1/2 years to determine how much capacity, if any, it wishes to purchase. And while no witness for Grain Belt even mentions this fact, when that time finally comes, MJMEUC can decide it will buy absolutely no capacity at all from Grain Belt. In other words, contrary to what Grain Belt implies in its testimony, MJMEUC has definitely not agreed to purchase 200 MW or any other amount of capacity on the proposed line. It is just as accurate to say they have committed to buy nothing at all.

It is fair to assume that the provision which in effect allows MJMEUC to cancel its contract with Grain Belt was inserted for MJMEUC’s protection. For a number of reasons, that provision certainly is not in the best interests of Grain Belt. So if it was added at the insistence of MJMEUC, that can only mean that MJMEUC wished to retain its option to jettison the Grain Belt contract if it finds something more attractive over the next 4 1⁄2 years. This possibility is particularly relevant here because before signing the TSA with Grain Belt, MJMEUC made no meaningful analysis of what other options it might have. We do not now know the extent to which the relative prices of different supply sources will change over the next 4 1⁄2 years, but we do know that such changes are inevitable.

Accordingly, the Grain Belt/MJMEUC contract provides no assurance to the Commission that MJMEUC and its member utilities will actually buy any capacity on the Grain Belt line. And the problem is, we won’t know the fate of that contact until years after a decision is rendered in this case.

As to other potential purchasers of capacity in Missouri, it’s déjà vu all over again. Despite its best efforts, Grain Belt once again has no contracts or Memorandums of Understanding with any load serving entity in Missouri to buy capacity on the proposed line – other than its drastically discounted deal with MJMEUC. In fact, it has no such agreements even with any of the Kansas wind farms. So once again, the inherent economics of the project have attracted no takers in Missouri. Just as in the 2014 case, the Commission is again being asked by Grain Belt to simply assume, or rather speculate, that some of its capacity will be used by someone to provide service somewhere in Missouri.

And Grain Belt is not likely to find any takers for any additional capacity at what they refer to as the normal rate for the Kansas to Missouri service. Certainly, none of the investor-owned utilities in Missouri has shown any interest. Grain Belt submitted a bid to Consolidated Electric Cooperative, but did not even make its “short list” of bidders. And finally, direct retail sales in Missouri are not an option.

The problem is, at Grain Belt’s normal rate for capacity, neither MJMEUC nor any other utility in Missouri would logically buy any capacity on the proposed line for delivery into this state. Based on a recent bid to MJMEUC from a Missouri wind farm, the purchase of Missouri wind would be less expensive than buying wind from Kansas and transporting it at the normal rate over the Grain Belt line into Missouri.

And the cost advantage of Missouri wind does even take into account other factors favorable to the Missouri wind option: the 25% “bonus” afforded under Missouri’s RES for renewable energy generated in this state, and the minimal need for additional high-voltage transmission lines throughout Missouri.

As shown by MJMEUC’s initial rejection of Grain Belt for some two years, MJMEUC had no “need” for Grain Belt’s line until Grain Belt devised its discounted “first mover” rate – a rate clearly designed to gain a foothold in Missouri. And of course without that foothold, Grain Belt could not extend its line into the more lucrative markets in PJM and points east.

In other words, the only “need” for the line was created by Grain Belt where no such need had existed. And that need still does not exist if the “normal” charges reflective of the basic economics of the project are applied. The MLA respectfully submits that a contingent contract, based on an artificially low, below-cost rate, extended to a single buyer, does not satisfy either the “need” or the “public interest” prongs of the Tartan criteria.

Despite the above observations, if the Commission assumes that MJMEUC might eventually buy some capacity on the Grain Belt line, that should not logically end the decision-making process on this issue. At that point, the MLA submits that the Commission would then need to balance the modest benefits of a potential purchase by MJMEUC (the only likely user of the line in this state) against the definite detriments to Missourians of building a high-voltage transmission line, complete with hundreds of large steel support structures, over a 200 mile path through northern Missouri.

So, what are the real benefits to MJMEUC and its retail customers of its contract with Grain Belt? Clearly, the only logical way to measure those benefits is to compare the total cost that MJMEUC would pay for power under the contracts with Grain Belt and Infinity, to the total cost it would pay for the next best alternative. That comparison and only that comparison would show how much MJMEUC would truly save by signing on with Grain Belt and Infinity.

Comparing the Grain Belt contract to the Illinois contract it is replacing, for example, is a meaningless exercise. If the difference between the Grain Belt contract and the expiring Illinois contract was say $10 million per year, but MJMEUC could have signed a contract with a third party and saved say $3 million compared to the Grain Belt contract, then of course the $10 million “savings” is not a savings in any meaningful sense at all. The savings in that example would be only $3 million per year.

So the next logical question for the Commission is this: what was the annual cost to MJMEUC of the next best alternative to the Grain Belt contract? Surprisingly, as MJMEUC admits, they do not know the answer to that question. And they do not know because they did not bother to seek bids when looking to replace the Illinois contract.

They simply signed up with Grain Belt, not knowing what other options might be available.

To make up for this deficiency, in its presentation to the Commission MJMEUC has resorted to speculative and after-the-fact comparisons of other alternatives to the Grain Belt contract. As the evidence will show, however, none of those comparisons provide a reliable means to measure the amount (if any) which MJMEUC might save if the Commission allows Grain Belt to build its line through Missouri.

Good or service advertised and sold at below cost price. Its purpose is to bring in (lead) customers in the retail store (usually a supermarket) on the assumption that, once inside the store, the customers will be stimulated to buy full priced items as well.

It is also impossible to quantify the damages which Missourians will suffer if the line is built, but we know they will be real and they will be heart-wrenching. One cannot put a price tag on the inability to finally build a new home at a location which would now be draped by a 4,000 MW power line; or the negative impacts the line will inevitably have on farming a right-of-way punctuated with miles of steel towers; or the decrease in property values of nearby property, for which the owners will receive no compensation whatsoever; or the decision by some people, for whatever reason, to uproot their families and move to a different location if the proposed line is built. And of course there is the 200 mile eye-sore that Grain Belt dismisses as something the locals will simply learn to live with. So admittedly, it is impossible to quantify the damages which 200 miles of line and steel structures will cause to the people of Missouri.

But this much we do know. The only potential benefit which Missouri is likely to see is totally dependent on developments in the energy business over the next 4 1⁄2 years, the results of which will determine if MJMEUC opts out of its contract with Grain Belt. And even assuming it does not do so, the level of any benefits to MJMEUC and its customers are purely speculative at this point.

When Sabal Trail approached him, Dowdy agreed to a negotiated fee for the right-of-way and estimated crop loss because he knew if he balked, the government would help the company take it anyway. He agreed in good faith, as well. Sabal Trail promised that Dowdy’s land would be returned to its original state by early January, in time for the new planting season.

And this is where the dispute begins.

“I was assured that Sabal would adhere to Georgia Soil and Water provisions,” says Dowdy, “that they would adhere to guidelines for segregated top soil and sub soil…rebuild my terracing to insure erosion wouldn’t occur…and put everything back in pre-construction condition. They said they would do…in their words…everything it takes.”

Andrea Grover, Director of Stakeholder Communications for Sabal Trail, says the company “followed specific protocols in place for construction which include storm water, erosion and sediment control plans which all require best management practices or “BMPs.”

“Our representatives have worked with individual landowners over the course of the past 3 ½ years to address concerns as related to the project and its impact to agriculture,” Grover explains. “The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is the lead agency which approves pipeline projects, and Sabal Trail’s work is limited to only the FERC approved areas and conditions for construction. Project inspection personnel and our contractors all have the appropriate level of certifications for storm water controls inspection in Georgia.”

While Sabal Trail management promised that Dowdy’s farm would be back in business by the first week in January, and ensured that the project right-of-way would be “restored to its previous condition and contours,” that wasn’t the case. Repairs continued into February—and, worse, were still in progress when a major late January storm hit the state.

“I had already reached out to Sabal Trail management at least five times in December to say I was seeing erosion issues,” recalls Dowdy. “They promised to fix it immediately, but they never did, so when the storm came, we were completely unprotected.”

Dowdy thought he had made some headway with Sabal Trail when the company, in an attempt to make peace with an unhappy landowner, offered to pay Dowdy to make additional repairs to his land.

“They asked me to put together an estimate for attempting to repair the land, including an acceptable value I placed on my wetlands, and additional future yield loss,” says Dowdy. “We made a verbal agreement and I began repairs as instructed. Sabal knew the costs and agreed to pay for the estimated costs of repair.”

“When it came time for them to pay though, they introduced a condition—in order to get my reimbursement, I would have to sign a document releasing Sabal from future long-term yield loss, wetland violations and compensation. Here I was repairing what they messed up at my own expense and then they want more.”

Dowdy says his lawyer advised him not to sign and, thus far, he has not signed nor has he received a penny of the promised reimbursement from Sabal Trail.

Next Step…Litigation?

Dowdy’s laundry list of what wasn’t completed correctly by Sabal Trail is long.

“Sediment barriers were placed wrong, no hay was spread, there were no temporary terraces or berms…water was moving off my land at a 10% grade and sediment was going right into the surrounding wetlands and waterways. If Sabal had been in compliance with BMPs, I wouldn’t have been replacing 15,000 cubic yards of topsoil as I am having to do after the storm.”

Grover says Sabal Trail did return to Dowdy’s farm, and others impacted by pipeline construction, after the late January storm event, to “inspect the construction areas to ensure soil erosion devices installed according to the BMPs are working properly or repaired if necessary.”

But by then, says Dewey Lee, UGA Professor and Extension Agronomist, even though Sabal Trail installed additional BMPs after the storm damage was discovered, it was too late.

Lee who has worked with Dowdy on conditioning his farmland for a decade, says, “In the restoration that Sabal did, it appears they did not follow regulatory protocols perfectly. It appears that the crew handling the reconstruction did not have a full understanding of what their responsibilities were. This ultimately caused erosion down Randy’s waterways and across his field.”

Like Lee, irrigation specialist, Rance Harrod, knows well Dowdy’s attention to detail when it comes to his land. Dowdy and Lee’s suspicions that co-mingling of the top and sub soils in the fields was confirmed just last week after an irrigation supply line to the pivot began leaking. It was Harrod, along with Dowdy and a Sabal Trail employee, who worked on the fix.

Dowdy says as soon as Harrod began digging, it was apparent that the Sabal Trail repair crew had paid little attention to BMPs when it came to replacing the soil.

“Sabal has created tremendous soil loss and erosion resulting in offsite movement into the wetlands, no question about that. Randy’s damages are almost incalculable,” Lee adds.

“I shared pictures of the problems I was seeing with the Georgia Environmental Protection Department to show them things weren’t being done to regulations, hoping that they would take it up with Sabal,” says Dowdy. “But they said they needed to see it at the time it happened…that a later complaint wasn’t enough.”

Dowdy recalls he asked the agent “well where were you when it needed to be inspected?” He says the agent told him they didn’t have enough manpower to be everywhere along a 500-mile pipeline at all times.

“The only people inspecting what Sabal was doing to my land was Sabal,” says Dowdy. “The way I see it, it was like the proverbial fox guarding the hen house.”

Like many policies that were proposed by the Obama Administration, the DOE/Clean Line agreement is currently tied up in the courts.  DOE is involved in a lawsuit, forcing the agency to address the lingering doubts regarding the legal justification for the department’s decision.

If these concerns are ignored and the project is allowed to move forward, not only are Arkansans facing the prospect of losing their property due to a decision by the federal government, but your department risks codifying into law the practice of federal eminent domain seizures.  This dangerous precedent is antithetical to your distinguished record as a champion for states’ rights in the face of federal overreach.

Throughout your career you have been a champion of states’ rights.  This Administration has promised to give a voice back to its citizens.  This is a good way to show that commitment.

We will continue working to halt the project, not only because it violates property rights of Arkansans, but also because it violates the rights of all Americans to have their voices heard at the state and local level.  We hope you can appreciate our concerns and work with us to fight against this lingering overreach of the Obama Administration.

In a statement provided Monday to the media, Clean Line officials said the APPROVAL Act “creates more red tape and kills jobs by attempting to pull back approvals the project has already received.” The Clean Line statement also included a note of support from a large national union.

Clean Line Founder and President Michael Skelly said much consideration was given to the project before it was approved.

“We are very confident in the nearly decade long process undertaken by the U.S. Department of Energy in order to decide to participate in the project under Section 1222 of the 2005 Energy Policy Act. This law was passed with bipartisan support, including then-Congressman John Boozman’s, and signed by President George W. Bush,” Skelly said in the statement. “The Plains & Eastern Clean Line is a pro-jobs, pro-consumer, pro-environment public energy infrastructure project that will help to create a secure energy future for the country, and we are ready to get to work.”

Plains and Eastern state that they will assume all market risk associated with the development and construction of the Project and that there will be no captive customers.

“At the same time that our country is focused on creating opportunities for American workers, Arkansas Congressmen introduced a bill that will kill thousands of American jobs and, specifically, hundreds of Arkansas jobs,” said Lonnie Stephenson, International President of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). “Whether the infrastructure project be a pipeline or an electric transmission line, the IBEW strongly disapproves of politics getting in the way of American job creation.”

The Plains & Eastern Clean Line – the first new transmission line sited in this country in 45 years – would generate more than $9 billion in new investment.

The withdrawal of official support also comes not long after John Hobbs was voted in as a commissioner for Randolph County. Hobbs has been a vocal opponent of the Grain Belt Express.

Hobbs confirmed that the commission had rescinded the letter of support but declined to comment further on the matter.

Truesdell clarified that, although the commission has rescinded its official support for the wind energy transmission line, the attitude hasn't changed. The commission assumed a neutral stance on the matter around two years ago.

"The only thing that prompted action is that our legal counsel said that, if we wanted to be truly neutral, we should draft a letter to rescind the prior document," Truesdell said.


The move was meant to solidify the neutral stance of the commission, setting aside personal views the commissioners might hold, Truesdell said.

Randolph County Commissioner Wayne Wilcox said he was not present for the commission's vote to rescind the letter of support for the Grain Belt Express.

As was its position in Case No. EA-2015-0146, it is still Staff Counsel’s position that, not only must Grain Belt have the consent from each of the Missouri county commissions for its transmission line to cross the public roads and highways in their respective county before a Commission certificate for the line is effective, Grain Belt must have those consents before the Commission can lawfully issue the certificate, i.e., those consents are prerequisites to the certificate.